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INTRODUCTION
On March 11, 1992, this Court issued its opinion on the
transcript issue in State v. Menzies, Case No. 880161 (Utah
March 11, 1992).
Addendum A.

A copy of the slip opinion is contained in

The opinion can also be found at State v. Menzies, 182

Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1992).
This petition is filed pursuant to Rule 35, Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.

See generally Brown v. Pickard, 11 P. 512

(Utah 1886); Cumminas v. Nielsen, 129 P. 619 (Utah 1913).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In reaching the decision that one of the transcripts
prepared in the instant case was adequate for mandatory appellate
review of this capital homicide case, the Menzies opinion focuses
only on evidence which supports the conclusion, disregarding adverse
evidence.
The presumption of correctness does not apply to the
transcript since (1) even if Ms. Lee were a "de facto reporter/1
such status would allow her to act as court reporter but would not
give rise to a determination that a transcript prepared by her was
"prima facie correct," (2) the clear weight of the evidence
establishes that Ms. Lee was not a temporary reporter, and (3) the
"certifications" of the original transcript were proved false.
The Menzies opinion inappropriately relies on the docketing
statement to define the issues in this case.

The purpose of a

docketing statement is not to limit issues, especially in a capital
homicide case.

Given the length of this trial, the complexity of

this case, and the fact that a transcript was not available when the
docketing statement was filed, Mr. Menzies respectfully requests
that this Court reconsider reliance on the docketing statement in
minimizing the issues in this case.
The numerous significant acknowledged transcription errors
establish that the transcript is not adequate for appellate review.
The opinion inappropriately assumes at times that Ms. Lee took down
everything that was said, while acknowledging at other times that
gaps occur.

The opinion also gives mixed messages about the role of

plain error in capital cases.

For example, this Court relies at

times on defense counsel's lack of objection or challenge as
establishing that no error occurred.

Other specific concerns

regarding the resolution of various errors in the transcript are set
forth below.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE FACT STATEMENT MISSTATES THE FACTS
AND MAKES FACTUAL FINDINGS WHICH WERE NOT MADE BY
THE TRIAL COURT.
In setting forth the facts regarding the transcript and
analyzing those facts throughout the opinion, the opinion sifts
through all of the evidence presented in the new trial proceedings
and focuses only on the evidence which supports the determination
that the transcript is adequate.

The opinion disregards significant

evidence including but not limited to (1) evidence regarding
Ms. Lee's licensing problems in California and her suspension from
practice in that state (see Addendum I to Appellant's opening
brief), (2) difficulties with Ms. Lee's
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employment in Third District Court and her ultimate termination
(R. 1166:75, 77, 79; D.E. 14, 15, 16), (3) oversights in Ms. Lee's
hiring at Third District Court, including the failure to check
references, and dishonesty by Ms. Lee in the application process
(R. 1166:32), (4) the testimony of two court reporters who
established that Ms. Lee was unable to adequately record and
transcribe proceedings and who each held the opinion that Ms. Lee
was not capable of transcribing a capital homicide case
(R. 1185:15-16, 17, 20, 46, 47, 49, 50, 53).
The opinion states that Ms. Lee worked in the California
courts from August 1985 through July 1987 and that Ms. Lee stopped
paying her California dues when she moved to Utah because she did
not believe that she needed to keep her California certification.
Menzies, slip op. at 2.

The evidence establishes, however, that

Ms. Lee did not pay her dues in April 1987, at least three months
before she moved to Utah.

Defendant's Exhibit 2.

Hence, the latest

she could have legally worked in the California courts was April
1987, almost a year before this trial.1
This Court's finding that Ms. Lee believed that all she
needed to work in Utah was a national certification (Id.) disregards
the testimony of Linda Van Tassell, who discussed the need for a
Utah license with Ms. Lee and gave Ms. Lee money to get a Utah
license prior to Ms. Lee's hiring by Third District Court.

1. Much of this Court's fact statement is taken from the testimony
of Ms. Lee. That testimony, however, is internally inconsistent and
lacking in credibility.
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R. 1185:29-30, 35-6.

It also disregards Ms. Van Tassell's testimony

that Ms. Lee later told her that she had obtained a Utah license.
R. 1185:33-4.
In addition, it ignores the finding contained in the next
paragraph of the opinion that the administrative office of the
courts "determined that Lee could hold the position until June,
1988, when the next Utah examination for certified reporters was
scheduled."

Slip op. at 2, 8-9.

Any finding that Ms. Lee was a

temporary reporter presupposes that Ms. Lee was aware of this
temporary status and the need for a Utah license in order to become
a permanent reporter.
Furthermore, Ms. Lee testified that she was hired as the
official court reporter and, at the time of her hiring, she
represented that she had a license in California and the national
certificate.

R. 1166:107-8.

The finding that Ms. Lee was a temporary reporter is
supported by a single statement by Ron Gibson.

R. 1166:82-3.

However, Mr. Gibson also testified that Ms. Lee was hired as the
official court reporter (R. 1166:29), that he was not involved in
the hiring of Ms. Lee (R. 1166:32), and that he did not become
familiar with her until three months after she was hired
(R. 1166:29).

He also acknowledged that he told media reporters

that Ms. Lee had a Utah license.

R. 1166:33.

All of the evidence other than this single statement
demonstrates that Ms. Lee was not a temporary reporter.

Documents

in her personnel file, her own understanding of her position,
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letters between court personnel, and Ms. Lee's termination letter
dated September 1988 (three months after any temporary position
would have terminated) all refer to Ms. Lee as an official court
reporter and do not indicate in any way that she was hired in a
temporary capacity.
Lee.

Defendant's Exhibit, personnel file of Tauni

Furthermore, the position did not terminate in June 1988,

Ms. Lee made no attempt to take the licensing examination at that
time, and court officials apparently made no request that she do
so.

It is against the clear weight of the evidence to find that

Ms. Lee was a temporary reporter.
Although one court reporter testified that he used a
notereader, his testimony along with that of the other court
reporters established that such a practice is disfavored and that
reading the entire transcript prepared by a notereader is required.
R. 1185:11, 12, 36, 41, 43, 85, 89, 93-94.
The statement that it is "common practice" to read all of
the notereader's work (slip op. at 3) minimizes the necessity of a
reporter reading all work prepared by another in order to honestly
certify that the transcript accurately reflects what occurred in the
trial court.

R. 1185:11, 12, 43, 93-4.

Other factual problems occur throughout this opinion which
make it apparent that this Court relied on an inaccurate
transcript.

For instance, based on a review of the transcript, this

Court states, "it is clear that the interview took place between
February 23 and February 29."

Slip op. at 27. However, there was

no February 29 in 1986.
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POINT II. THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF REVIEW IS
CORRECTION OF ERROR FOR CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE
DETERMINATION.
Although this Court applied an abuse of discretion standard
in reviewing the trial court's denial of Mr. Menzies' motion for new
trial, the issues of whether the court reporter was certified or
de facto qualified and whether the transcript was adequate for
appellate review are questions of law which should be reviewed for
correctness.

See State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 n.3 (Utah

1991); State v. Thomas. 182 Utah Adv. Rep. 22, 23 (Utah 1992)
(reviewing whether second prong of McDonouah test met under a
correctness standard while reviewing denial of motion for new trial
under an abuse of discretion standard).
Judge Uno did not make a finding that the transcript
"adequately reflects the proceedings."

Slip op. at 4.

Instead, he

determined that he could make sense of the proceedings and that
there was nothing in the transcript that the five justices of this
Court and their clerks could not correct.

R. 1191:3.

Judge Uno

also found that the "California version" with Ms. Lee's input made
less sense than the version created by the notereader.

R. 1191:66.

This Court should reconsider the deference accorded the
trial judge.
POINT III. "QUALIFICATIONS OF THE COURT
REPORTER" DO NOT REQUIRE THE APPLICATION OF A
PRESUMPTION OF CORRECTNESS.
The opinion indicates that a presumption of correctness
applies to the transcript based on three alternative analyses:
(1) that the relevant statutes allowed unlicensed persons to certify
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transcripts, (2) that Ms. Lee was a de facto court reporter, and
(3) that Ms. Lee was a temporary reporter.

Each of these three

bases for applying a presumption of correctness is flawed.
First, regardless of whether the statutes allow an
unlicensed person to certify a transcript so as to give rise to a
"presumption of correctness," Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-6 presupposes
that a person who has not read the transcript cannot "certify" it as
correct.

Ms. Lee never read the entirety of the transcript and

therefore falsely "certified" the original version as accurately
reflecting what occurred in court.

Where the falsehood of the

certification is established, the "prima facie correct" analysis
should not apply.
The determination that the use of a notereader does not
preclude using the transcript (slip op. at 9) disregards the fact
that the notereader was not present and that Ms. Lee's version is
significantly different from the version prepared by the notereader.
It is unclear which version of the transcript this Court
considers the official version to be used on appeal.

If it is the

original version prepared by the notereader, Ms. Lee's reading of
the notes during the California version is irrelevant and a
presumption of correctness is being applied to a transcript which
has not even been reviewed by the court reporter.
In addition, the statutes seem to require that the only
exception to the licensing requirement occurs where a person is duly
appointed as a temporary reporter.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-15, 17

and 6 can be read in harmony as requiring that a reporter either be
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licensed in Utah or appointed as a temporary in compliance with
§ 78-56-17 to be able to certify a transcript.
Second, as pointed out in the fact statement, supra at 4-5,
the clear weight of evidence establishes that Ms. Lee was not a
temporary reporter.

She was appointed as the official reporter,

stayed in the position after the June expiration date for any
temporary position, and was not asked to take the June test or leave
the position even though the Utah court administrator's office knew
that she had been declared incompetent in California and was
concerned about her performance.
The opinion is inconsistent in that it acknowledges that
Ms. Lee "was appointed court reporter" (slip op. at 3) but also
claims that she was only a temporary reporter.

Furthermore,

§ 78-56-17 requires that the previous reporter be temporarily
disabled or removed.

Although the opinion states that it is "clear"

that the previous reporter was either disabled or amoved, such is
not the case.

Bob Lewis, Judge Uno's previous reporter, quit in

December 1987 to take a job in the federal system.

Ms. Lee was not

a temporary reporter; she was appointed as Judge Uno's official
court reporter, and it is against the clear weight of evidence for
this Court to find otherwise.
Third, although the opinion emphasizes the de facto
doctrine in concluding that a presumption of correctness applied,
Judge Uno did not apply such doctrine.

Nor did Judge Uno make any

findings as to whether Ms. Lee assumed the "official authority under
color of valid appointment" or whether the public acquiesced in the
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authority.

See slip op. at 6.

Instead, Judge Uno made a wholly

distinct finding—that Ms. Lee was de facto qualified for the job.2
In analyzing the de facto doctrine as it applies to this
case, the opinion states that "throughout her tenure as a court
reporter, [Ms. Lee's] eligibility for the position was not
questioned.11

Slip op. at 6.

On the contrary, defense counsel

questioned Ms. Lee's ability during the course of the trial, after
she prepared a transcript of the Britton testimony, and after she
cried.

Ms. Lee's personnel file indicates that the court

administrator's office was aware, sometime prior to May 1988, that
Ms. Lee had been declared incompetent to act as a court reporter in
California, and was concerned about her ability to timely complete
the Menzies transcript as early as June 1988.

Defendant's Exhibits

5, 6, 9.3

2. Nor did the State argue on appeal that the de facto doctrine
applied to Ms. Lee so as to make her capable of certifying a
transcript.
Although application of the de facto doctrine arguably
allows use of a transcript prepared by Ms. Lee where the accuracy of
that transcript is established, it is a leap to apply such a
doctrine so as to create a presumption that a transcript prepared by
a de facto reporter is accurate. In other words, while the de facto
doctrine may be used to refute Mr. Menzies' "per se" argument in
Point I of his opening brief that a transcript prepared by an
unlicensed individual cannot ever be used, the doctrine does not
extend to the application of a presumption. None of the cases cited
by this Court as part of its de facto analysis involve the
application of a presumption of correctness. Instead, they simply
hold that the person could act in the capacity based on their
de facto status.
3. Nevertheless, Ms. Lee's position did not terminate in June, and
she was not required to take the June 1988 reporters examination as
would have been the case were she appointed as a temporary reporter
three months after she took the job with Judge Uno.
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Whether Ms. Lee would have automatically gotten a license
in Utah had she kept her California license current (slip op. at 7)
is irrelevant since Ms. Lee had not had a current California license
in nine months when she took the job in Third District Court.
Defendant#s Exhibit 2.
Nor is it true that "if Ms. Lee had understood the need and
requirements for a Utah license, she could have obtained the
appropriate certification as easily as she obtained the national
certification."

Slip op. at 7.

Utah's licensing requirements were

stricter than those of the national organization at the time Ms. Lee
took the job in Third District Court.

Furthermore, Ms. Lee was not

in good standing in California since she had not paid her dues and
her license had lapsed nine months before.

In addition, she was

encountering problems in California based on her failure to file
transcripts in cases heard more than nine months earlier.

Indeed,

her problems in California had reached such a peak that she was
declared incompetent to act in the California courts less than a
month after the trial in the present case ended.
Exhibit 2, 5.

Defendant's

That finding of incompetency has never been lifted

and she has since been suspended from practice in California.

It is

doubtful that Ms. Lee could have easily obtained a Utah license had
someone contacted California.
Finally, even if this transcript were to be considered
"prima facie correct" under § 78-56-6, the opinion gives too much
strength to that consideration.

The "prima facie correct" language

of § 78-56-6 is weaker than a presumption of correctness; where a
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prosecutor makes out a prima facie case, a presumption of guilt does
not attach.

Likewise, even if the transcript were considered

prima facie correct, it should not be given the tremendous
presumption of correctness which was afforded in this case.
POINT IV. THIS COURTS RESOLUTION OF THE
ACKNOWLEDGED TRANSCRIPTION ERRORS REQUIRES
RECONSIDERATION.
The opinion repeatedly relies on other portions of the
transcript to support its interpretation of the transcript at a
given spot.

E.g., slip op. at 11 ("errors are obvious when viewed

in the context of the relevant passage") ("defense counsel stated
that eight jurors were challenged for cause and not dismissed"), 12
(although some juror answers are inarticulate, a review of
transcript reveals what their responses were), 14 (determination
that same basic information is sought in another question), 15
(although some admonitions were omitted, review of other admonitions
demonstrates that no prejudice exists), 16 (discrepancies between
the two versions of the transcript are of minor importance) (look to
questions asked of jurors to reconstruct list of questions), 18
(able to tell that gap in jurors responses was not prejudicial by
looking to the rest of the transcript), 19 (Savage's testimony
establishes factual basis for Britton claim).

Because those other

portions are potentially equally flawed, such reliance is misplaced.
In relying on other portions of the transcript as if they
were accurate, this Court ignores the impact of omissions and
assumes that Ms. Lee took down everything that was said in court.
However, the testimony of Ms. Young that Ms. Lee omits portions of
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what is said (R. 1185:46-8), along with the acknowledgement by this
Court that gaps occur in the transcript (slip op. at 17, 29),
establish that Ms. Lee routinely failed to take down portions of
testimony, arguments and voir dire.

It is difficult for defense

counsel to raise issues contained in those omitted portions or for
this Court to review any such portions in this case.
The opinion incorrectly assumes that Ms. Lee was capable of
taking down everything that was said on the record in court and that
any difficulties occurred during the transcription process rather
than during the notetaking process (e.g., slip op. at 11, 12, 15).
This is contrary to the acknowledgement in other portions of the
opinion that Ms. Lee omitted portions (Id. at 14, 16-18) and the
testimony of both court reporters who indicated that Ms. Lee had
difficulty accurately taking down everything that is said in
addition to difficulty transcribing her notes.

R. 1185:17, 46-8.

In addition, the opinion gives mixed messages about the
role of plain error in capital cases.

By repeatedly relying on the

arguments of counsel and the rulings of the trial judge as
compensating for errors and omissions in this transcript, this Court
seems to be suggesting that the plain error doctrine and the related
procedure for reviewing the entire proceedings in a capital case are
of little importance (e.g. , Id,, at 11, 12, 15, 25). This is
contrary to the rule that this Court will review the entire
proceedings in capital cases for manifest error.

See State v.

Holland, 777 P.2d 1019, 1021-2 (Utah 1989); State v. Tillman, 750
P.2d 546, 551-3 (Utah 1987).

See, e.g., slip op. at 25 ("no such
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argument was ever raised at trial").
Furthermore, the opinion disregards the implication in
State v. Eldredcre, 773 P.2d 29, 35 n.8, 36 n.ll (Utah 1989), which
is extrapolated in State v. Braun. 787 P.2d 1336, 1342 (Utah App.
1990), that an error which might not be very obvious nevertheless
requires reversal where it has an overwhelming impact on the
proceedings.

Portions which are not included in the transcript

cannot be reviewed for obvious error.
A. TRANSCRIPTION ERRORS DURING VOIR DIRE REQUIRE
A NEW TRIAL.
The determination that "[i]n order for mistakes in the
transcript to prejudice Menzies' appeal, the error must occur in the
voir dire of a juror who either sat on the case or was challenged
for cause and not dismissed" (Id.) fails to take into consideration
the possibility that plain error occurred in failing to remove a
juror, or that defense counsel ineffectively represented Mr. Menzies
by failing to challenge a juror for cause.

This statement also

fails to acknowledge the importance of a complete record in
assessing harmless error.
In State v. Perrv, 401 N.W.2d 748, 754 (Wise. 1987), cited
by this Court in footnote 28 on page 10, the court stated:
An appellate court cannot function if it has no
way to determine whether error has been
committed. In most instances, a transcript is
required for appellant's counsel to locate error
and for an appellate court to verify or disprove
it. Frequently, plain error—error usually not
pinpointed in the course of trial—can only be
discovered and proved by a transcript. Moreover,
whether error is prejudicial or harmless is
usually determinable only in the context of the
entire record.
- 13 -

1.

Questions Regarding Capital Punishment

The fact that the jurors did not decide penalty does not
erase the death qualification procedure and any errors that occurred
therein from this Court's review.

See slip op. at 12, 15.

Errors

which occurred during death qualification nevertheless impact on the
guilt/innocence phase.
First, Ms. Lee did not know the jurors would not decide the
penalty when she failed to accurately record this critical part of
voir dire.

The errors and omissions during death qualification are

indicative of the overall inaccuracy of the transcripts.
In addition, as the defendant claimed in State v. Moore,
697 P.2d 233, 237 (Utah 1983), "numerous studies ... indicate that
death qualified juries are more inclined to convict than non-death
qualified juries."

This Court acknowledged in Moore that such

studies "may well be correct[]."

Id.

See Hovey v. Superior Court,

616 P.2d 1301, 1314-25 (Cal. 1980) (outlining various studies which
analyze the conviction prone attitude of jurors in relation to
jurors' attitude towards capital punishment; Lockhart v. McCree, 476
U.S. 162 (1986) (dissent outlines pro-prosecution bias of death
qualified jurors as established in studies; majority acknowledges
that at least one of the studies demonstrating that death qualified
juries were more guilt prone was not fatally flawed).
A juror who should not have served during the penalty phase
was equally unqualified to serve during the guilt/innocence phase.
The fact that the jurors did not decide the penalty in this case
does not mitigate the possibility that the jurors who decided guilt
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should have been selected differently.

See generally Vasquez v.

Hillery. 474 U.S. 254 (1986) (racial prejudice in grand jury
selection not harmless even though defendant subsequently convicted
since there was no way to determine whether a properly selected
grand jury would have issued indictments, and, if so, on what
counts).
Although the United States Constitution does not preclude
death qualification of a jury (see Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162
(1986), Article I, § 12 of the Utah Constitution may well preclude
such a process.
In addition, the specific answers of the jurors during the
death qualification process are critical to a determination of
whether they should have been removed, and should not be dismissed
by this Court.
2.

Gap in Transcript Purina Voir Dire

This Court recognizes that a gap occurs in the transcript
during voir dire after the trial judge asked whether any of the
jurors or members of their families or close friends had been
victims of a similar crime.

This Court also acknowledges that "it

is not possible to tell from this portion of the transcript whether
the gap incorporates testimony of the other jurors."

Id. at 18.

This Court determined, however, that this acknowledged gap is
inconsequential since counsel did not object to or question further
any of the jurors based on their experience regarding violent crime.
This resolution assumes that Ms. Lee accurately took down
all of defense counsel's challenges and further assumes that defense
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counsel was not ineffective in failing to question jurors further or
challenge them for cause.
Information that a juror or a juror's close friend or
family member has been the victim of a similar crime is critical
information in exercising challenges for cause and peremptory
challenges.

See State v. Woolley. 810 P.2d 440 (Utah App. 1991);

State v. Thomas, 182 Utah Adv. Rep. 22 (Utah App. 1992).

This

acknowledged gap in the responses makes it impossible for appellate
counsel and this Court to review this record to determine whether
defense counsel adequately explored these areas and made appropriate
challenges for cause.
3. Assumption That Trial Judge Asked Question
Identically Each Time
Although the opinion acknowledges a gap in the voir dire
questioning and the possibility that Ms. Lee did not record each
question as it was asked (slip op. at 15, 17), 4 it resolves any
prejudice arising from this failure by pointing out that the judge
had a list of standard questions which he asked, and the jurors were
given a copy of this list.

This resolution of the issue assumes

that the trial judge correctly and identically asked each question

4. On page 15, the Court states: "There is an indication that
either the notereader or Ms. Lee failed to record each question as
it was asked and simply repeated the question asked of previous
jurors." Unless the inclusion of "the notereader" in this statement
was an oversight, this statement indicates a fundamental
misunderstanding on the part of this Court in regard to the
preparation of the transcript. The notereader was never present in
court and therefore would not have had the opportunity to fail to
record anything that was asked. This acknowledged failure is
attributable only to Ms. Lee.
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and that the jurors were reading along.
The resolution of the failure to record all questions
disregards the acknowledgement in State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839
(Utah 1988), and State v. Bell, 685 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1984), of the
importance of voir dire examination and the subtleties of that
process.

The change of a single word can alter the impact of a

response as it relates to a defendants exercise of his or her
challenges.
The failure to record all voir dire questions requires a
new trial.
B.

State v. Tavlor, 664 P.2d 439 (Utah 1983).
ADMONITIONS

Although the opinion states that the judge conducted a
second individual interrogation of each juror after a juror was
contacted and told about Mr. Menzies' prior record, a review of the
record establishes that Juror Gass was never questioned as to
whether she had been contacted.
C.

T. 2398, 2402.

NUMBERS

Although many of the numbers contained in this transcript
are not accurate, the opinion resolves the problem by stating that
any issues regarding numbers do not involve prejudicial error.

This

position disregards the fact that every number in this transcript is
unreliable.
D.

IDENTIFICATION OF MENZIES

This Court acknowledges that discrepancies between the two
versions exist as to the distance at which Larabee first viewed the
man at Storm Mountain and the date on which the composite was made.
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Id.

The opinion determines, however, that the discrepancies are

insignificant because (1) "Larabee identified the man as Menzies" at
trial, (2) Larabee's later answer establishes what was said earlier
and he did not see the face until the third viewing, and (3) "[n]o
motion was ever made to suppress the identification, and no claim
concerning the identification" was in the docketing statement.

Id.

A review of the record establishes that the opinion
misconstrues the facts and inappropriately relies on the three bases
listed above in reaching its conclusion.
First. Larabee did not identify Menzies at trial.

The

prosecutor never asked Larabee to make an identification, and he did
not volunteer one.

T. 1192-1215.

Larabee selected an individual

other than Menzies at the lineup (T. 1268) and did not identify
Menzies at the preliminary hearing, which was held after the
lineup.

T. 1279, 1295.
Although Larabee had said one of the photos in a photo

spread might be Menzies, he had initially been unable to make a
selection, and when he ultimately pointed out the photo, he was not
certain that it was the man he had seen at Storm Mountain.
T. 1685-6.
Defense counsel learned for the first tim€>, during
prosecutor Ernie Jones7 redirect examination of Larabee, that on the
way back to the prosecutor's office after the lineup, Larabee had
asked Jones "if it was number 6."

T. 1285.

Number 6 was Menzies.

Second. Larabee never saw a frontal view of the man's face
and was not certain that the man he saw the first time with a woman
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was the same man he later saw leaving alone,

>

'J J"

" ! 1 ' i "i1 .

Third, the State's failure to provide Defendant with
information as to the post-lineup conversation and Larabee's
inability to make a positive photo selection are identification
issues being raised on appeal in this case. Menzies argued in the
trial court that the State improperly failed to provide this
information.

T

1 296, I! 3 32-5.

The trial judge ordered that the

testimony regarding the post-lineup conversation be stricken based
I ii i I 111 i I 11 | • i i i 11 lo I i • i • i >v< ] i , ml 1! I ''»'* I 111 I | ,

on the prosecutor "

made a confusing admonishment which may have detracted from
Menzies's evidence that Larabee picked another individual at the

discovery violation.

-31'3-4.

!-I

IN TRANSCRIPT

The

.

in

in I iiiMii.i 1 i'dqitifi

I lli.il

I In

I m i l »oi i p t i o n

ill

"I"

hi^i

does not accurately reflect what occurred ii n court and that an
omission
c

"ranscript occurred.
•

omission i^

S lip op

at 29-30.

This Court

nsignificant even though there is

no w . ,»t knowing what is missing, non sequiturs appear in the
transcript, and significant issues regard i in | |inoi I <i i nt i in i exist in
this case.

In additi on, the acknowledgement that: "

that an omission occurred" (slip op. r

-.:,.*<*r

contrasts with the

testimony of Ms. Lee, who stat*
was omitted at this point.

R.

-

i.- contrast further

emphasizes the unreliability of Ms. Lee's work.

- xJ

-

F.

RELIANCE ON DOCKETING STATEMENT

In various portions of the opinion, this Court resolves a
problem with the transcript by stating that an error has no
significance on appeal because it does not relate to an issue listed
in the docketing statement.

Slip op. at 14, 26, 28.

This focus

gives an unprecendented and impractical role to a docketing
statement in the appellate process.
In this case, as is almost universally the case in indigent
criminal appeals, the docketing statement was filed before the
transcript was prepared.5

This case involved a six-week trial; the

attempts to reconstruct the transcript lasted over a year.

In

recognition of the complexity of this case and the fact that the
docketing statement did not list all of the issues Menzies intends
to raise on appeal, Appellants opening brief contained in
Addendum M a tentative Table of Contents listing potential appeal
issues in this case.
Rule 9(b), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure outlines the
purpose of a docketing statement.

It states:

The docketing statement is not a brief and should
not contain arguments or procedural motions. It
is used by the appellate court in assigning cases
to the Supreme Court or to the Court of Appeals
when both have jurisdiction, in making
certifications to the Supreme Court, in
classifying cases for determining priority to be

5. Rule 9, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that the
docketing statement be filed within 21 days of the notice of appeal;
this is only 11 days after the designation of record is due.
Rule 11(e)(1), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The Rules of
Appellate Procedure do not contemplate that an appellant will have a
transcript when preparing a docketing statement.
- 20 -

accorded them, in making summary dispositions
when appropriate, and in making calendar
assignments.
(emphasis added).
The opinion uses the docketing statement for a purpose for
which it was not intended to be used under the rules or at the time
of its preparation.
Furthermore, appellate counsel for criminal defendants has
the responsibility in al 1 cases, but In particular
t en I'HV i PU

-i I i H I M i: j p t t

capital cases,

i l e t e r n i i UP WIJ

docketed all meritorious appellate issues or has failed to raise in
the trial court an issue which either creates plain error or results
" i<»f t e e t I v '•. .it ,K i s I. a11, i , ' - j >M .e I

xssues

_ ^ necessarily

not be included in the docketing statement.
Ever -. f this Court maintains i ts position regarding the
I tin k

I ' iiji"

i c a n c e o f the e r r o r s

in tin, 1

t r a n s c r i p t , Mr. M e n z i e s

respectfully requests that it reconsider its decision to rely on the
d o c k e t i n g statemenf

.\i•;

11 II i 1 1 1 1 1 i 1

II n

i /•,i•,mi»>«,

1 1 n l 11 i s

i•,.isc•.

CONCLUSION
Mr

Menzies respectfully requests that this Court

reconsider i fc < 1P' • i s \ o\ \ a n d reliea i I h<» t s s u e s MI > L I u i I ii 1 it11 e I n •
SUBMITTED this

22-

day of April, 1992.

JOAN C. WATT
Attorney-Sor Defendant/Appellant

ID G. UDA1
A t t o r n e y f o r Defenflant/AppeI I ant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that ten copies of the
foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Supreme Court, 332 State
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, and four copies to the Attorney
General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114,
this okh^

day of April, 1992.

^rfasrOCf^M
JOAN C. WATT

DELIVERED by
this

day of April, 1992.

- 22 -

ADDENDUM A

This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter,

--—00O00-

Sfcate of U t a h ,
P l a i n t i IT <-IMII '\pi»^ I I M %
v.

Ralph Leroy Menzies,
Defendant and Appellant.

No.

880161

F i L
March i x ,

_J92

,
Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Raymond S. Uno
At 'U"! oiifys: R. Paul Van Dam, Charlene Barlow,, Sal: Lake
for plaintiff
Brooke C, Wells, Joan C. Wall/ Ricnaiu VJ .
Salt Lake City , for defendant

HALL. Chief Justice:
Ralph Leroy Menzies appeals from the denial of i;is
motion for a new trial. We affirm. The issue on appeal is
whether the trial court abused its discretion in rulinq that
the record is sufficient, for appellate review.
On March 8, 1988, altei a jury trial, Menzies was
convicted of first degree murder,J a capital offense, and
aggravated kidnaping,2 a first degree felony. He waived the
right to a jury for the penalty phase of the proceedings, and
the trial court sentenced him to death. On May 26, 1988, he
filed a docketing statement in this court, raising twenty-nine
issues on appeal. The trial transcript was certified on
September 5, 1988. In preparing his brief, Menzies observed
that the record contained numerous transcription errors. On
November 15, 1989, prior to submitting his brief, Menzies
filed a "motion to set aside judgment and/or for a new trial"
on the ground that transcription errors rendered the record
inadequate for appeal. The trial court referred the matter to
this court, and Menzies modified his motion to include claims
concerning the qi lalifications of the cour t reporter.
1.
2.

See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202.
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302.

We remanded the case to the trial court to conduct
proceedings to correct the record, pursuant to rule 11(h) of
the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, 3 We also directed the
trial court to rule on Menzies' motion for a new trial and to
resolve all issues relating to the qualifications of the court
reporter and the adequacy of the transcript.
On remand, several hearings were held in the trial
court. It was established at these hearings that the court
reporter, Ms. Tauni Lee, was not licensed in the state of
Utah. However, evidence was presented that Lee attended
Empire Business College in Santa Rosa, California, where she
completed a twenty-month course in court reporting. In 1985,
Lee passed the California certified shorthand reporter
examination. She tested at a speed of 200 words per minute
and received an overall score of 97 percent. From August 1985
through July 1987, she worked as a certified court reporter in
municipal court in Sonoma County and in municipal and superior
court in Marin County. During her tenure in California, Lee
completed several transcripts that were used for appeals.
In July 1987, Lee moved to Utah. She stopped paying
her California dues because she believed it was no longer
necessary to retain her California certification. By reason
of nonpayment of dues, her California certification lapsed.
Lee, thinking that a national certification was all that was
needed to work in Utah, applied for certification from the
National Shorthand Reporters Association ( M NSRA"). On the
basis of her California test scores, Lee obtained a national
certification and began paying dues to the NSRA.
In January 1988, Lee was appointed court reporter in
the Third Judicial District Court. The administrative office
of the courts was aware that Lee was not licensed in Utah.
However, on the basis of her qualifications and because she
was the only applicant, the office determined that Lee could
hold the position until June 1988, when the next Utah
examination for certified reporters was scheduled. This
determination was based on Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-17, which
provides for the appointment of unlicensed court reporters on
a temporary basis.^ Lee reported Menzies' trial in February
and March 1988.
In preparing the transcript of Menzies' trial, Lee
used a note reader and a proofreader. The note reader would
transcribe Lee's shorthand notes and mark any portions of the
transcript where she had difficulty reading the notes. Lee
would then proofread the portions of the transcript that were
marked. The proofreader read over the rest of the
3. R. Utah S. Ct.
Utah Supreme Court
presently be found
4. See infra note
No. 880161

11(h) (1988). In 1990, the Rules of the
were amended. Similar procedures can
in Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 11(h).
27 and accompanying text.
2

transcripts, looking foi misspellings and similar errors. It
was established in the hearings that certified reporters use
note readers in preparing transcripts, and Lee's note reader
was considered "excellent." However, it was common practice
for the coi irt reporter to proofread all the work prepared by a
note reader.
1n November 19 9 0, the tria 1 court denied Menzies"
motion for a new trial based on Lee's licensure status, The
court ruled that Lee was "de facto" qualified because of her
"training, testing, and experience." The court also ruled
that for a new trial to be granted on the basis of transcription errors, Menzies must show that the errors are
uncorrectable and prejudicial. After this ruling, the pait ies
continued i n thei r attempts to correct the record.
procedures to COrrect the record, Lee
A s par{- 0 £ ^e
read from her shorthand notes while representatives of both
parties read from a copy of the original transcript.
Discrepancies between the original version and Lee's notes
were noted on this copy of the transcript. Because the
process was conducted in California, this copy of the
transcript is referred to as the "California version."
addition to the proofreading of the original transcript,
several motions and stipulations were filed in an attempt r »
correct the record. However, in many instances, the parties
were unable to agree on what had occurred at trial, and
therefore, the record could not be corrected through the
procedures of rule 11(h).
Proceedings were also conducted to determine if the
errors that existed in the record warrant a new trial. It was
established that the trial judge, a member of the prosecutor's
staff, and two lawyers representing Menzies had read the
transcript from cover to cover. After this extensive review,
the trial court concluded that none of the transcription
errors were prejudicial. On February 20, 1991, the trial
court issued its final ruling, denying Menzies' motion for a
new trial on the ground that "the transcript is sufficiently
accurate to afford defendant a full and fai r review of his
issues on appeal." The court also designated the California
version of the transcript, as well as the original version of
the t ran s c r i p t, as pa rt o£ t he re c o rd on appeal.
In the instant appeal, we review on] y issues
concerning the adequacy of the transcript
We do not reach
the merits of the conviction and sentence,
I,

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The decision to grant a new trial pursuant UJ ui an
Rule of Criminal Procedure 24 i s a matter within the
discretion of the trial court. Accordingly, we will no!
reverse a ruling denying a new trial "absent a cl eat abuse oi
Nn . Mil 0 1 lb 1

that discretion."5 Generally, we will not find abuse of
discretion unless, given the applicable facts and law, the
trial court's decision is unreasonable.^ indeed, granting
the trial court deference is appropriate. The judge who
presided over the trial is in a far better position to
determine whether the record adequately reflects the
proceedings.
We also note that in appeals from trials where a
sentence of death is imposed, the scope of appellate review is
expanded. -This Court will review errors raised and briefed
on appeal in death penalty cases, even though no proper
objection was made at trial, but will reverse a conviction
based upon such errors only if they meet the manifest and
prejudicial error standard."7 In addition, we have the
prerogative to notice plain errors that are apparent on the
face of the record even if the appellant does not complain of
the error on appeal.8 To be considered plain or manifest
error, an error must be both harmful and obvious. 9
II.

QUALIFICATIONS OF THE COURT REPORTER

At the trial level, Menzies argued that because Lee
was not licensed in Utah, the transcript she prepared could
not be used on appeal. The trial court rejected this
argument, ruling that Lee's licensure status did not affect
the validity of the transcript because Lee was "de facto"
qualified. On appeal, Menzies claims that this ruling
constitutes abuse of discretion.
Menzies' argument is based on Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-56-15, 10 which provides that "no person may be
5. State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 222 (Utah 1985); see
also State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 793 (Utah 1991); State v.
Weaver, 6 P.2d 167, 169 (Utah 1931); State v. Mellor, 272 P.
635, 639 (Utah 1928).
6. See Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 805 n.19
(Utah 1991); Huston v. Lewis, 818 P.2d 531, 534 (Utah 1991);
State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 1991); State v.
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781-82 n.3 (Utah 1991).
7. State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 553 (Utah 1987).
Although Tillman is a plurality opinion, all five justices
concurred in the portion of the opinion which delineates the
appropriate scope of review. Id. at 552-53, 577, 582, 583,
591.
8. IJLL at 552-53.
9. See State v. Eldredqe, 773 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 62 (1989)? see also State v. Holland, 777
P.2d 1019, 1026 n.3 (Utah 1989).
10. Menzies also cites a similar provision in Utah Rule of
Appellate Procedure 11(e). However, this rule was not in
effect at the time Menzies was tried, and no analogous
(Continued on page 5.)
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appointed w the position of -horthand reporter nor act in
that capacity
. unless in has received a certificate from
the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing," and
on Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-206(2) and Utah Rule of Criminal
Procedure 26(10), which provide for mandatory review of the
"entire record" in every case in which a sentence of death is
imposed. Menzies asserts that these statutes and rule 26(30)
implicitly provide that only a transcript prepared by a
certified reporter may be used to review a capital case
iii
the alternative, he argues that even if the transcript can be
used, the presumption that the record is correct, provided in
Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-6, should not apply to a transcript
that was not prepared by a certified reporter,^However, section 78-56-15, section 76-3-206;-,,
rule 26(10) neither prohibit the use of transcripts prepared
by an uncertified reporter nor revoke the presumption of
correctness for transcripts prepared by uncertified reporters.
Furthermore, although section 78-56-15 requires a Utah license
for the position of court reporter, section 78-56-17 provides
for unlicensed court reporters under certain conditions.* 2
The rules of statutory construction require that these
sections be read together, harmonizing their provisions so
that neither section negates a part of the o t h e r . 1 3
Given
this rule of construction, section 78-56-15 cannot be read as
a total prohibition against the use of transcripts prepared by
uncertified reporters. Nor can this section be read as
providing that transcripts prepared by uncertified reporters
are not entitled to the presumption of correctness. Therefore, Menzies 1 statutory argument is no' compelling.
In d n y event, the trie. ..ourt's ruling was not based
on statutory construction, but on the finding that Lee was
de facto qualified to report the case. Utah, along with many
other jurisdictions, has adopted the de facto officials
doctrine,14
Under this doctrine, persons who are
(Footnote 10 continued.)
language exists in the Rules
• .. . , M
W5*_
R. Utah S. Ct. 11.
11.
Utah Code Ann, § /ti-r>: • provides, n A transcript oi a
reporter's notes, written in longhand or typewritten,
certified by him as being a correct transcript of evidence a**u
proceedings, is prima facie a correct statement of such,
evidence and proceeding."
12.
See infra note 27 and accompanying text. Rule 3-304 of
the Code of Judicial Administration also provides for the
appointment of unlicensed reporters under conditions where
certified shorthand reporters are not available.
13.
Jerz v. Salt Lake County, 822 P.2d 770, 773 (Utah 1991);
Murray Citv v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1318 (Utah 1983); Millett
v. Clark Clinic Corp., 609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1980).
14. Vance v. Fordham, 671 P. 2d ] 24, 1 30 ?1 (rT| ah) . cert^
denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1983).

5

r

*R0ifii

technically ineligible for a public office may be considered
de facto officials if they assume official authority under
color of a valid appointment and public acquiescence in the
authority. 15 In the interest of justice, the actions of a
de facto official are considered valid as to third persons and
the public. 16 Utah courts have relied on this doctrine to
uphold the actions of administrative committees even though
one of their members failed to meet the statutory requirements
to sit on the committee; 17 the actions of district judges
sitting on the supreme court; 18 and the actions of a county
attorney even though the attorney had never posted a required
bond. 1 9 Other jurisdictions have applied the de facto
doctrine to myriad actions taken by various public
officials, 20 including actions of de facto court
reporters. 21
The circumstances of the instant case clearly fall
within this doctrine. Lee assumed authority as a court
reporter under color of a valid appointment, and the public
acquiesced in her authority. Indeed, throughout her tenure as
a court reporter, her eligibility for the position was not
questioned. Furthermore, the trial court found that on the
15. Vance, 671 P.2d at 130-31 & n.5; see also State v.
Gambrell, 814 P.2d 1136, 1139 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The de
facto doctrine discussed in Vance may also apply in situations
where there is not an appointment under color of law. Vance,
671 P.2d at 130-31 & n.5.
16. Vance, 671 P.2d at 130-31 & n.5; see also Gambrell, 814
P.2d at 1139.
17. Vance, 671 P.2d at 130-31 & n.5.
18. In re Thompson's Estate, 269 P. 103, 128 (Utah 1927).
19. Gambrell, 814 P.2d at 1139.
20. See, e.g., In re Bunker Hill Urban Renewal Project IB,
389 P.2d 538, 552 (Cal.) (upheld actions of redevelopment
agency though one of its members ineligible because not
resident of proper city), cert, denied, 379 U.S. 28 (1964);
People v. Montova, 616 P.2d 156, 162 (Colo. Ct. App. 1980)
(upheld action of special prosecutor who was ineligible
because member of attorney general's office); Olathe Hospital
Found., Inc. v. Extendicare, Inc., 539 P.2d 1, 12 (Kan. 1975)
(upheld action of appeals panel though some of panel members*
terms had expired); Marshall v. Keller, 226 N.E.2d 743, 745
(Ohio 1967) (upheld actions of industrial commission though
some members ineligible); People v. Jackson, 558 N.Y.S.2d 590,
590 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (upheld conviction though
prosecuting attorney not member of any bar); see also Hussey
v. Smith, 99 U.S. 20, 24 (1878); State v. Carroll, 38 Conn.
449, 471-72 (1871).
21. Bavte v. State, 599 S.W.2d 231, 234 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980);
Stacv v. Waoers, 264 S.W.2d 299, 302 (Ky. Ct. App. 1959);
Harris County v. Hunt, 388 S.W.2d 459, 465 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App.
1965) .
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basis of luii "training, testing, and experience," Lee was
qualified to transcribe Menzies' trial, and Lee believed ttlat
she had the certification necessary for the position.
Clearly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
ruling that Lee was de facto qualified to report the case AM
a de facto reporter, any transcript which Lee prepared is
entitled to the same treatment as a transcript prepared by a
court reporter whose eligibility for the position is not
questioned.
Menzies does not contend that the de facto doctrine
should not apply to court reporters; rather, he argues that
the trial court erred in finding that Lee possessed the
qualifications for the position. In support of this
assertion, Menzies points to evidence produced at the hearings
which tends to show that Lee did not possess the qualifications
of a court reporter under Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-16.22
Specifically, he asserts that evidence was presented showing
that Lee lacked the requisite skill and was of bad moral
character. However, the existence of conflicting evidence is
not sufficient to set aside a trial court's finding.23 A
trial court's factual findings will not be disturbed unless
an appellate court, giving deference to the trial court's
superior position to assess credibility, nevertheless
concludes that the finding is clearly erroneous.24
In the instant case, there was sufficient evidence
concerning Lee's training, testing, and experience to support
the trial judge's determination that Lee was qualified.
Indeed, it was established that if Lee had kept her California
certification current! she could have obtained a Utah license
without taking the Utah test.25 It appears, therefore, that
if Lee had understood the need and requirements for a Utah
license, she coiild have obtained the appropriate certification
as easily as she obtained the national certification. Furthermore, the trial court had sufficient information from the
22. Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-16 establishes the requirements
for court reporters and provides, "Any citizen of the United
States at least 18 years of age, of good moral character, who
possesses a high degree of skill and ability in the art of
shorthand reporting, and who passes a satisfactory examination
as provided :i n this chapter, is entitled to a certificate
if

23. See state v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 788 (Utah HUH),
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987).
24. See Goodman. 763 P.2d at 788; Walker, 743 P.2d at 193,
25. Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-12 provides, HThe division may
issue a license without examination to a person who has been
licensed in any state, district or territory of the United
States or in any foreign country, whose education, experience,
and examination requirements are, or were at the time the
license was issued, equa] b ^: -* of this state."
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testimony and the court's dealing with Lee to make a
determination as to her "moral character."
In addition to the de facto doctrine, another ground
supports the trial court's ruling that the transcript may be
used and is entitled to the presumption of correctness. It is
clear that, as a matter of law, Lee was a temporary reporter
and therefore had the statutory authority to report the case
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-17. Although the trial
court did not base its ruling on section 78-56-17, we may
uphold a trial court's ruling on any proper ground. 26
Section 78-56-17 provides:
If any regularly appointed certified
shorthand reporter is disabled from
performing his duty or is removed from his
position, the judge of the court in which
that certified shorthand reporter has been
appointed may appoint any substitute he
deems competent to act during such
temporary disability of the regular
reporter and until his successor is
appointed. The temporary appointment shall
continue only until the next regular
examination for certified shorthand
reporters held by the Division of
Occupational and Professional Licensing.
The administrative office of the courts determined
that despite the fact that Lee did not have a Utah license,
she could work as a temporary reporter pursuant to this
section. This determination is undoubtedly correct. The
plain language of the statute establishes that a "temporary
substitute" does not have to meet the requirements of a
"regularly appointed certified shorthand reporter," but only
needs to be deemed competent by the trial judge. 27 In the
instant case, the record clearly establishes that both the
trial judge and the administrative office of the courts found
that Lee was qualified for the position. Moreover, it was
26. See Utah R. Crim. P. 30; see also Buehner Block Co. v.
UWC Assoc., 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988); Citv Elec. v.
Industrial Indem. Co., 683 P.2d 1053, 1060 (Utah 1984).
27. When the terms of a statute are plain, we construe the
statute in accord with its usual and accepted meaning. See,
e.g., Brinkerhoff v. Forsyth, 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1989);
Utah County v. Orem Citv, 699 P.2d 707, 709 (Utah 1985).
Indeed, apart from the plain language stating that a temporary
reporter need only be "deemed competent," the provision that a
temporary reporter may hold the position only until the next
scheduled test supports the interpretation that an uncertified
reporter may work as a temporary reporter.
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established cnat Lee was the only applicant for the position,
and she reported Menzies' case between the time she was hired
and the time of the "next regular examination f--" <-rMfied
shorthand reporters."
Menzies argues that section 78-56-1 7 cannot apply :i n
this case because the record does not show that Lee's
predecessor was "disabled" or "removed from his position
However, the record reveals that there was a vacancy. The
precise reason for the vacancy has no bearing on Lee's status
as a temporary reporter. Clearly, the former court reporter
must have been either "disabled" or "rei noved" for the vacancy
to exist. Therefore, Lee had the statutory authority to
report Menzies* case, and pursuant to section 78-56-17, the
transcript may be used on appeal and is entitled to the
presumption of correctness.
Menzies also argues that Lee's use of a note reader
precludes the use of the transcript on appeal or, alternatively, prevents the transcript from being presumed correct.
As noted above, however, it was established that certified
court reporters use note readers and that the note reader Lee
used was considered "excellent." While Lee did not initially
proofread the entire transcript, a general procedure when
using a note reader, she did read over all her notes during
the proceedings to correct the record. Given these facts,
there is no basis for the assertion that Menzies is entitled
to a new trial because Lee used a note reader to assist i n the
preparation of the transcript.
We therefore conclude that the trial cour I: did not
abuse its discretion in ruling that Menzies is not entitled to
a new trial by reason of Lee's licensure status and that the
transcript Lee prepared :i s ent:i 11 ed I: o t: he presumption of
correctness
III

TRANSCRIPTION ERRORS

Menzies claims that he is entitled to a new tri.
the ground that transcription errors rendered the record
inadequate for appeal. Specifically, he argues that the trial
judge erred in ruling that a new trial will not be granted
unless it is shown that the transcription errors prejudiced
Menzies' appeal. In the alternative, Menzies claims that the
trial court erred in ruling that none of the transcription
errors are prejudicia3
A.

Requi remen t of Prejudice

Menzies' first argument, that he is not required to
show prejudice, is based on Lee's licensure status and the
fact that there are numerous transcription errors in the
record
As he] d above, Lee meets the requirements of both a
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de facto reporter and a temporary reporter; therefore, the
instant transcript is to be treated as any other transcript
certified on appeal. Furthermore, while it is true that the
record contains transcription errors, the mere existence of
such errors does not mandate a new trial. The clear weight of
authority requires a showing of prejudice to overturn a
conviction on the basis of transcription errors. 28 Indeed,
this court has followed such an approach.29
In State v. Taylor, 30 we reversed a conviction on
the ground that omissions in the transcript rendered the
record inadequate for appeal. In so holding, we did not
simply note that the transcript did not accurately reflect the
proceedings. Rather, we emphasized that extensive omissions
in the voir dire of jurors who were challenged for cause and
whose recorded answers illustrated prejudice prevented review
of the defendant's claim that the trial court erred in not
dismissing the jurors,21 a claim that could have resulted in
reversal.32 we hold, therefore, that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in ruling that Menzies must show that
his appeal is prejudiced by the transcription errors in order
to be granted a new trial.
B.

Errors Claimed to be Prejudicial

Menzies' second argument, that many of the
transcription errors are prejudicial, focuses on general
errors that occurred in portions of the transcript relating to
voir dire and the admission of the preliminary testimony of
Walter Britton. In addition, Menzies cites specific errors
relating to the transcription of numbers, the penalty phase,
28. See, e.g., Edwards v. United States, 374 F.2d 24, 26
(10th Cir. 1966); Stirone v. United States, 341 F.2d 253, 255
(3d Cir.), cert, denied, 381 U.S. 902 (1965); United States v.
Sioal, 341 F.2d 837, 850 (3d Cir.), cert, denied, 382 U.S. 811
(1965); Addison v. United States, 317 F.2d 808, 810 (5th Cir.
1963), cert, denied, 376 U.S. 905 (1964); People v. Chessman,
341 P.2d 679, 690-92 (Cal.), cert, denied, 361 U.S. 925
(1959); People v. Feiqin, 345 P.2d 273, 281 (Cal. Ct. App.
1959); State v. Perry, 401 N.W.2d 748, 752 (Wis. 1987); see
also Edward L. Raymond, Jr., Annotation, Court Reporter—Dead
or Disabled, 57 A.L.R.4th 1049, 1061 (1987); Seldon R.
Shapiro, Annotation, Court Reporting—Omissions, 12 A.L.R.
Fed. 584, 586 (1972).
29. State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439, 445-47 (Utah 1983); see
also Emia v. Hayward, 703 P.2d 1043, 1048-49 (Utah 1985);
Whetton v. Turner, 497 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1972), cert,
denied, 414 U.S. 862 (1973); Utah R. Crim. P. 30.
30. 664 P.2d 439.
31. Id. at 445-47.
32. Id. at 447; State v. Bailev, 605 P.2d 765, 768 (Utah
1980); State v. Moore, 562 P.2d 629, 631 (Utah 1977).

in

and the swearing in of witnesses. In a related claim, he
argues that he is prejudiced because the transcription errors
prevent an adequate review of the record for plain error.
However, a review of the record reveals that none of
the cited errors are prejudicial. The errors are obvious in
nature and reconcilable when viewed in the context of the
relevant passage or by referring to documentary evidence, and
none have any bearing upon issues raised on appeal. Furthermore, it is possible to cure any conceivably prejudicial
errors without retrying the case. This can be seen by
addressing Menzies' claims separately.
1.

Voir Dire

Menzies advances several claims of error relating to
the voir dire portion of the transcript. Specifically,
Menzies asserts that (1) some of the prospective jurors'
responses to questions are unintelligible and/or do not make
sense, (2) the note reader "made up" admonitions, questions,
and answers, and (3) questions and answers are omitted from
the transcript. Because of these errors, Menzies argues that
neither version of the transcript can be used to review
appellate issues relating to voir dire.
Voir dire in the instant case was extensive. It
lasted approximately one week, and thirty-one jurors were
dismissed for cause. There was a general voir dire, during
which prospective jurors were questioned as a group, followed
by individual voir dire. The individual voir dire was
primarily concerned with capital punishment. Menzies* original
docketing statement raised two claims relating to voir dire.
He asserted that the court committed reversible error by
refusing to excuse certain jurors who were challenged for
cause and abused its discretion by rehabilitating prospective
jurors. Objections made at trial preserved these issues.
Before examining Menzies' specific claims, it is
important to note that it is not necessary to examine the voir
dire of every prospective juror. In order for mistakes in the
transcript to prejudice Menzies* appeal, the error must occur
in the voir dire of a juror who either sat on the case or was
challenged for cause and not dismissed.
The jurors who sat on the panel are easily
identifiable from the jury list, the polling of the jury after
the conviction, and a second voir dire that took place late in
the trial after one of the jurors received prejudicial
information from an anonymous phone call. Likewise, it is
possible to determine which jurors were challenged for cause
and not dismissed. At the end of voir dire, defense counsel,
in order to preserve her objections for appeal, stated that
eight jurors were challenged for cause and not dismissed.

11

No. 880161

Review of the transcript confirms the fact that eight jurors
were challenged for cause and not dismissed.
(a) Answers unintelliq ible.
Several of Menzies* unintelligible or inappropriate
answers cites involve voir dire of pertinent jurors. However,
a review of the transcript reveals that the jurors* responses
are readily reconcilable and/or nonprejudicial.
It is true that some of the jurors' answers are
inarticulate.33 However, this may well be attributable to
the jurors, not to the reporter. In any event, in each
instance, one is able to ascertain that the juror is
appropriately responding to the question posed. Difficultly
with the answers can generally be reconciled by viewing the
answer in the context of the question, and in each instance,
it is possible to understand the juror's response. Furthermore, a vast majority of errors cited by Menzies relate to
capital punishment. However, the jurors did not sit for the
penalty phase of the proceedings. These questions are not
highly relevant to an appeal of Menzies' conviction, and
therefore, slight confusion surrounding these questions is n u
prejudicial. In addition, there are only one to four errors
in a given juror's voir dire, and the voir dire questions are
33. The following are examples of alleged transcript errors
cited by Menzies:
A JUROR: MY NAME IS KATHLEEN WINN. I
WORK FOR FIRST INTERSTATE BANK IN THE
SPECIALIZED DEPARTMENT.
• • • •

THE COURT: WHAT RELATIONSHIP SHOULD
THERE BE, IF ANY, BETWEEN WHAT THE VICTIM
SUFFERED AND WHAT THAT PERSON THAT CAUSED
THAT SHOULD SUFFER?
A JUROR: AGAIN, IT'S BACK TO MY
FEELINGS. IF THE INDIVIDUAL PREMEDITATEDLY
OR PLANNED IT OUT THOROUGHLY AND KNEW
EXACTLY WHAT HE OR SHE WAS DOING, WHICH TO
ME WOULD BE A DIFFICULT THING FOR THAT
INDIVIDUAL TO DO, IF THAT INDIVIDUAL WAS
PROVEN THAT THEY DID DO THAT, THEN THAT
RELATIONSHIP PROBABLY SHOULD BE DEATH
PENALTY.
BUT IF THE INDIVIDUAL DID NOT, WHICH
MY FEELING, I GUESS. THAT THERE IS A
DIFFICULT RELATIONSHIP THERE BETWEEN WHAT
THE VICTIM SUFFERED VERSUS—THERE IS A LOT
OF MENTAL SUFFERING, OBVIOUSLY, FROM--I
WOULD HOPE FROM THE PERPETRATOR'S SIDE, AND
THAT WOULD, TO ME, BE AN IMMENSE LOAD TO
HANDLE.
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redundant.34

The prejudicial effect of a transcription

34. The following is a list of the individual voir dire
questions:
(1) HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY?
(2) WHY?
(3) HAVE YOU EVER SHARED WITH ANYONE ELSE
YOUR FEELINGS ON THE DEATH PENALTY?
(4) WITH WHOM?
(5) HAVE YOUR VIEWS ON THE DEATH PENALTY EVER
CHANGED?
(6) ARE YOU PRESENTLY IRREVOCABLY COMMITTED
TO WHAT PENALTY A PERSON CONVICTED OF
FIRST DEGREE MURDER SHOULD RECEIVE?
(7) SHOULD THIS TRIAL ENTER A PENALTY PHASE,
WOULD YOU FOLLOW THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS
AND VOTE FOR THE PENALTY ONLY IF THE
STATE HAS PROVED BEYOND A REASONABLE
DOUBT THAT THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
OUTWEIGH THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES AND
THAT THE DEATH PENALTY IS THE ONLY
APPROPRIATE PENALTY?
(8) DO YOU BELIEVE THAT ALL PERSONS CONVICTED
OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER SHOULD BE PUT TO
DEATH?
(9) UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCE DO YOU FEEL
PUTTING SOMEONE TO DEATH IS WARRANTED?
(10) DO YOU BELIEVE THE DEATH PENALTY IS
ORDINARILY PROPER PUNISHMENT FOR THE
CRIME OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER?
(11) IF THE JURY SHOULD CONVICT MR. MENZIES OF
FIRST DEGREE MURDER, WOULD YOU BE ABLE TO
CONSIDER VOTING FOR A SENTENCE LESS THAN
DEATH?
(12) IS LIFE IN PRISON A SEVERE PENALTY IN
YOUR OPINION?
(13) WHAT DO YOU UNDERSTAND A LIFE TERM IN
PRISON TO MEAN?
(14) WOULD YOU VOTE FOR THE DEATH SENTENCE IN
ORDER TO INSURE THAT NO RELEASE FROM
PRISON EVER OCCURRED?
(15) HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT OUR CURRENT SYSTEM
OF RELEASING CONVICTED PERSONS FROM
PRISON ON PAROLE AFTER APPROVAL FROM THE
BOARD OF PARDONS?
(16) DO YOU BELIEVE THAT A LIFE SENTENCE COULD
ACCOMPLISH THE SAME GOAL OF PREVENTING
REPEATED CRIMINAL ACTIVITY IN THE SAME
WAY AS THE DEATH PENALTY?
(17) DO YOU SEE ANY CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE
DEATH PENALTY AND THE TEACHINGS OF YOUR
RELIGION?
(Continued on page 14.)

13

Nn . n n m c^

error in a voir dire question is diminished where the same
basic information is sought in another question.3^ Given
these facts, the instances of inarticulate answers are not
prejudicial.
(b)
answers.

Note reader "made up" admonitions, questions, and

(i) Admonitions. The court reporter did not
record some of the judge's admonitions. Instead, she often
used asterisks to represent admonitions throughout the
transcript. However, Menzies, in his original docketing
statement, did not raise the claim that the jurors were
subject to improper influences or acted in an improper
manner. Many of the judge's admonitions were properly
recorded. Furthermore, near the end of the trial, after one
(Footnote 34 continued.)
(18) WHAT RELATIONSHIP SHOULD THERE BE, IF
ANY, BETWEEN WHAT THE VICTIM SUFFERED AND
WHAT THE PERSON THAT CAUSED THAT SHOULD
SUFFER?
(19) ARE YOU WILLING TO CONSIDER EVIDENCE
WHICH MITIGATES IN FAVOR OF A DEFENDANT
AND A LIFE SENTENCE SHOULD THIS TRIAL
ENTER A PENALTY PHASE?
(20) IF A PERSON WERE TO BE CONVICTED OF FIRST
DEGREE MURDER, WHAT INFORMATION WOULD YOU
THEN LIKE TO KNOW BEFORE MAKING A
DECISION AS TO A PENALTY?
(21) DO YOU BELIEVE A PERSON CAN CHANGE AND
BECOME BETTER OVER TIME?
(22) HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT THE PSYCHIATRIC
PROFESSION?
(23) CAN SOCIAL WORKERS OR PSYCHOLOGISTS HELP
PEOPLE CHANGE?
(24) DOES THE FACT THAT QUESTIONS CONCERNING
THE DEATH PENALTY HAVE BEEN ASKED RAISE
DOUBTS IN YOUR MIND AS TO THE INNOCENCE
OR GUILT OF MR. MENZIES?
(25) DO YOU HAVE ANY CONCERNS THAT YOU MIGHT
BE CRITICIZED FOR NOT IMPOSING A DEATH
PENALTY?
(26) WHAT WOULD YOUR FEELINGS BE ABOUT SERVING
ON A JURY WHOSE FUNCTION IS TO TRY A
FIRST DEGREE MURDER CASE WHERE IF THE
PERSON IS CONVICTED, YOU WILL HAVE TO
CONSIDER IMPOSITION OF A DEATH SENTENCE?
35. See generally State v. Miller. 727 P.2d 203, 206 (Utah
1986); State v. Larocco. 665 P.2d 1272, 1273 (Utah 1983);
State v. Sessions. 645 P.2d 643, 647 (Utah 1982) (all holding
no error in refusing to grant instruction if point is covered
in another instruction).
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juror was exposed to prejudicial information, the trial judge
conducted a second individual interrogation of each juror,
inquiring whether any of them had been subjected to any
outside influence. The record, therefore, is adequate to
review any claim relating to admonitions* and jury misconduct.
(ii) Questions. There is an indication that either
the note reader or Lee failed to record each question as it
was asked and simply repeated the question asked of previous
jurors. This is apparent because an error in a question
concerning capital punishment was repeated throughout the
transcript.36 Beginning with the third prospective juror,
each juror was asked, "DO YOU BELIEVE THAT A LIFE SENTENCE
COULD ACCOMPLISH THE SAME GOAL OF REPEATED CRIMINAL ACTIVITY
IN THE SAME WAY AS THE DEATH PENALTY?" The first and second
jurors were asked if life imprisonment could accomplish the
goal of preventing repeated criminal activity. However, no
juror appears to have been confused by the question. When a
juror's answer involved more than yes or no, it was clear that
the juror understood the question. Neither the defense nor
the prosecution challenged the propriety or the content of the
question. Furthermore, the prospective jurors were given a
list of the questions and could read along as the judge asked
them. Given these facts, it is likely that the jurors were
asked the correct question.
Even assuming that this mistake cannot be
reconciled, it is not prejudicial. The question is one
directed toward capital punishment and is therefore not
directly at issue in the case. This is particularly true in
this instance, where confusion occurs only if jurors* answers
are limited to yes or no. In addition, there are other
appropriate questions which cover the same basic issue.37
This error, therefore, does not prejudice Menzies' appeal.
(iii) Answers. Close examination of the pertinent
prospective juror responses does not reveal any instances
36. Menzies' contention that some voir dire questions have
not been recorded is addressed infra notes 40-48 and
accompanying text.
37. Examples include:
IS LIFE IN PRISON A SEVERE PENALTY IN YOUR
OPINION?
WHAT DO YOU UNDERSTAND A LIFE TERM IN
PRISON TO MEAN?
WOULD YOU VOTE FOR THE DEATH PENALTY IN
ORDER TO INSURE THAT NO RELEASE FROM PRISON
EVER OCCURRED?
HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT OUR CURRENT SYSTEM OF
RELEASING CONVICTED PERSONS FROM PRISON ON
PAROLE AFTER APPROVAL FROM THE BOARD OF
PARDONS?
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where the note reader "made up" actual juror answers. There
are a few discrepancies between the original transcript and
the court reporter's notes. However, these discrepancies are
minor in nature and do not bear upon the substance of the
prospective juror's response,38 and again, a vast majority
of these discrepancies occur in questions concerning capital
punishment. Given these facts, the discrepancies are not
prejudicial.
(c)

Omissions.

Menzies asserts that the transcript lacks voir dire
questions and answers. In support of this contention, he
cites to portions of the transcript which deal with individual
voir dire. By reason of the fact that the same questions weie
asked of each juror, it is possible to reconstruct the list of
individual voir dire questions and compare the list with the
testimony of the pertinent prospective jurors. 39 Such an
approach reveals that in voir dire of two pertinent jurors,
the transcript does not contain a question asked of all other
pertinent jurors. 40 The individual voir dire questions were
read from a prepared list; therefore, it is likely that these
questions were asked but not recorded.
In arguing that these omissions require a new trial,
Menzies relies on State v. Taylor. 41 As discussed above, in
Taylor we ordered a new trial because omissions in the voir
dire portion of the transcript rendered the record inadequate
for appeal. 42 In reaching this conclusion, we noted that
the omissions were extensive, the answers in the record
indicated that jurors harbored prejudice, and the omissions
occurred in portions of the transcript that directly reload
to issues on appeal. 43 in the instant case, only one
question asked of two jurors was omitted, other questions
cover the same basic information,44 and the question
38. A representative example of such a discrepancy is the
following: The original transcript reads, "MY WIFE'S NAME IS
DOREEN. SHE IS AN ACCOUNTING CLERK WITH EVERETT MEDICAL
CENTER," while the court reporter's notes read "University
Medical Center."
39. See supra note 34.
40. The transcription of Spencer Morgan's and Jack Wall's
voir dire does not contain question nine, "UNDER WHAT
CIRCUMSTANCE DO YOU FEEL PUTTING SOMEONE TO DEATH IS
WARRANTED?" Menzies claims that the attorneys, in argument
concerning cause, referred to questions that are not found in
the transcript. However, his cites do not support this
contention.
41. 664 P.2d 439 (Utah 1983).
42. Id. at 447.
43. Id^_ at 445-47.
44.
Some examples of similar questions are the following:
(Continued on page 17.)
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concerns capital punishment and is therefore not directly at
issue in the case. Given these circumstances, these omissions
are not prejudicial, and the instant case is clearly
distinguishable from Taylor.
Although not cited by Menzies, the following
omission in the general voir dire is also worth notice:
THE COURT: HAVE YOU OR MEMBERS OF YOUR
FAMILY OR CLOSE PERSONAL FRIENDS EVER BEEN
A VICTIM OF A CRIME OF A SIMILAR NATURE AS
THOSE WHICH ARE INVOLVED IN THIS CASE? . . .

THE COURT: DON JACKSON. WOULD THE FACT
THAT YOUR NEXT-DOOR NEIGHBOR OR THAT POLICE
OFFICER WAS KILLED PREVENT YOU FROM SITTING
IN ON THIS CASE AND TRYING THIS CASE ON ITS
MERITS?
A JUROR: LAST WEEK I WAS ROBBED IN MY
BUSINESS.
THE COURT: DO YOU FEEL YOU CAN LISTEN TO
THE EVIDENCE AND THE EVIDENCE ALONE TO
REACH A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL VERDICT?
A JUROR:

PROBABLY.

THE COURT:

OKAY.

ANYONE ELSE?

It is clear from this colloquy that there is a gap in the
transcript.
hearing.

Don Jackson was dismissed for cause due to poor
Therefore, the fact that portions of his responses

(Footnote 44 continued.)
(10) DO YOU BELIEVE THE DEATH PENALTY IS
ORDINARILY PROPER PUNISHMENT FOR THE CRIME
OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER?
(11) IF THE JURY SHOULD CONVICT
MR. MENZIES OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER, WOULD
YOU BE ABLE TO CONSIDER VOTING FOR A
SENTENCE LESS THAN DEATH?
(19) ARE YOU WILLING TO CONSIDER EVIDENCE
WHICH MITIGATES IN FAVOR OF A DEFENDANT AND
A LIFE SENTENCE SHOULD THIS TRIAL ENTER A
PENALTY PHASE?
(20) IF A PERSON WERE TO BE CONVICTED OF
FIRST DEGREE MURDER, WHAT INFORMATION WOULD
YOU THEN LIKE TO KNOW BEFORE MAKING A
DECISION AS TO A PENALTY?
17
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are missing is of no concern, Rather, the difficulty is that
it is not possible to tell from this portion of the transcript
whether the gap incorporates testimony of other jurors. Nonetheless, this gap is not prejudicial.
As noted above, it is possible to identify jurors
who were challenged for cause and not dismissed. 45 In the
arguments concerning whether these jurors should have been
dismissed for cause, there was no mention of any concerns
stemming from their prior experience with violent crime. It
is clear, therefore, that Menzies did not object to any juror
on any basis related to the missing testimony. In addition,
when problems arose in the general voir dire, the jurors were
questioned further on the subject in individual voir dire.
None of the pertinent jurors were questioned concerning prior
experience with violent crime. Thus, the record indicates
that the pertinent jurors' testimony did not raise questions
concerning their experience with violent crime. Furthermore,
although there were no other questions dealing directly with
past experience with violent crime, several other questions
dealt with the presumption of innocence and prospective
jurors' prejudice against criminal defendants.4^ Given
these facts, this omission i;s distinguishable from the
omissions in Taylor and does not prejudice Menzies' case on
appeal. 4 7
45. See supra section III.B.l.
46. During the general voir dire, the jurors were repeatedly
asked if they could "LISTEN TO THE EVIDENCE AND THE EVIDENCE
ALONE AND REACH A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL VERDICT." In addition,
in the individual voir dire, the jurors were asked if "THE
FACT THAT QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE DEATH PENALTY HAVE BEEN
ASKED RAISE DOUBTS IN YOUR MIND AS TO THE INNOCENCE OR GUILT
OF MR. MENZIES."
47. Omissions present different problems of determining
prejudice than other transcript errors. Often, it is not
possible to tell how much testimony is missing, and therefore,
it is not possible to determine if an appealable issue arose
in the unrecorded portion of the proceeding. In dealing with
the prejudicial effect of transcript omissions in noncapital
cases, courts have focused on whether the omission impacted
issues that had been preserved at the trial level and raised
on appeal. See Taylor, 664 P.2d at 445; Seldon R. Shapiro,
Annotation, Court Reporting—Omissions, 12 A.L.R. Fed. 584,
586 (1987). Such an approach may not be appropriate in
capital cases, where we often review errors raised for the
first time on appeal. State v. Holland, 777 P.2d 1019, 1026
(Utah 1989). In addition, we have "the sua sponte prerogative
. . . to notice, consider, and correct [plain] error which is
not . . . assigned on appeal, but is palpably apparent on the
face of the record." State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 552-53
(Utah 1987) (footnote omitted).
(Continued on page 19.)
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The record is adequate to provide Menzies with a
full and fair review of any claim relating to jury selection,
2.

Britton Issue

Menzies claims that he is prejudiced by the numerous
transcript errors in portions of the record relating to the
admission of the preliminary hearing testimony of Walter
Britton. Britton was imprisoned in the Salt Lake County jail
at the same time as Menzies. At Menzies* preliminary hearing,
Britton testified that Menzies had confessed to the murder.
However, Britton refused to testify at trial on the ground
that he feared reprisals from other inmates. The trial court
ruled that Britton was unavailable under Utah Rule of Evidence
804, and his preliminary hearing testimony was read to the
jury. In his docketing statement, Menzies asserts that he was
denied his right of confrontation due to the fact that he was
not able to cross-examine Britton on information learned
subsequent to the preliminary hearing and the fact that a
subpoena served on the State's counsel was quashed. Menzies
also claims that the trial court erred in ruling that Britton
was unavailable.
The factual basis for these claims is provided
through the testimony of Mr. Savage, Britton's attorney.
Savage testified at a pretrial hearing and during trial. His
testimony concerned Britton's competence and a rule 35 hearing
in federal court. In the rule 35 hearing, it was argued that
because Britton cooperated in the State's case against
Menzies, his federal sentence should be reviewed. One of the
(Footnote 47 continued.)
There is always a slight possibility that plain error
occurred in a portion of the missing transcript. However,
this court has never ordered a new trial based on the mere
possibility that absent an error, a different result could
have occurred. Rather, we will reverse if there is a
reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of
the proceedings, State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah
1989), or when the error affects a federal constitutional
right, if there is a reasonable doubt that the error affected
the outcome of the proceeding, State v. Tuttle. 780 P.2d 1203,
1213 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 494 U.S. 1018 (1990). A
criminal defendant in a capital case does not have a
constitutional right to an independent review of the record
for plain error. See Tillman, 750 P.2d at 552-53 (independent
review of record not mandatory). Therefore, since no
objection was made at trial on the basis of this testimony and
this omission was not cited by Menzies in this appeal, the
omission cannot be the basis for a new trial unless there is a
reasonable likelihood that a manifest and palpable error
occurred in the missing portion of the transcript. That
standard has not been met.

19

No. 880161

prosecuting attorneys testified briefly in this hearing.
During the trial, Menzies subpoenaed the prosecutor to testify
regarding his participation in the federal hearing. The only
other relevant testimony is the reading of the preliminary
hearing transcript and Britton's pretrial hearing testimony
concerning why he would not testify at trial. Menzies cites
more than sixty errors relating to this portion of the
transcript. Virtually all of them relate to insignificant
grammatical or spelling problems or to mistranscriptions where
the actual sense of the testimony is obvious. None of the
cited errors prejudice Menzies' ability to pursue his claims
on appeal. Nor is there any error significant enough to
interfere with an independent review of the trial court's
decision.
(a)

Testimony.

In the relevant testimony, there are instances of
discrepancies between the court reporter's notes and the
original transcript 48 and instances of inarticulate
statements. 49 However, these errors are reconcilable when
read in context and/or have no relevance to appellate issues.
Nevertheless, Menzies points to this portion of the transcript
to illustrate his claim that the transcript prejudices his
ability to appeal. Specifically, he claims that confusion in
the transcript concerning whether Savage first discussed a
rule 35 hearing with prosecutors before or after Menzies'
preliminary hearing prejudices his ability to raise issues
48. The following occurred during the hearing testimony of
Britton: "Q. YOU HAVE MAILING PRIVILEGES, DON'T YOU?
A. YES, MA'AM, I DO. Q. YOU ALSO HAVE TELEVISION [court
reporter's notes read "telephone"] PRIVILEGES, DON'T YOU?
A. YES, MA'AM, I DO." Although there is a discrepancy in the
transcript, the important information, that Britton had access
to news reports concerning the murder, is present in the
transcript.
49. Britton also stated:
NO, MA'AM, IT'S NOT. IF I MAY TAKE AND
INTERRUPT FOR A MINUTE. I HAVE TAKEN
PLACES ON THE RECORD THAT I WILL NOT
TESTIFY IN THIS HEARING, AND I HAVE
LISTENED TO BOTH OF YOU. YOU HAVE TOOK AND
PLACED MY LIFE IN DANGER, NOT DIRECTLY
BECAUSE OF RALPH MENZIES, BUT BECAUSE OF
TESTIFYING IN ITSELF IN THE ENVIRONMENT I
LIVE IN, AND I WILL NOT AND I REPEAT WILL
NOT SAY ANYTHING MORE BECAUSE IT IS FOR MY
OWN HEALTH.
(Emphasis added.) Even assuming that the difficulty with this
statement is the result of transcription errors and not the
result of Britton's own misstatements, the essential
information is preserved for the record.
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regarding Britton's motive for testifying in the preliminary
hearing.*0
It is true that conflicting dates are given
concerning this conversation. In a proffer of proof made to
the court, a prosecutor claimed that if Savage testified, he
would state that the first time he had contact with the
prosecuting attorneys was on May 26, after the preliminary
hearing. Savage, in fact, testified that he first had contact
with the prosecutors on May 2, prior to the preliminary
hearing. Read in context, this conflict is clearly not the
result of a transcription error but rather the result of the
attorney's confusion as to what evidence Savage would
provide. Indeed, confusion as to whether the first discussion
occurred before or after the preliminary hearing was one of
the reasons the trial judge allowed Savage to testify at the
hearing. Therefore, it is clear not only that there is no
prejudicial error in the transcript, but also that the
transcript supports Menzies' claim that Britton had a motive
to testify falsely.
(b)

Argument.

The vast majority of the errors which Menzies cites
do not deal with testimony but rather with arguments held
outside the presence of the jury. In fact, of the sixty cited
errors, more than fifty deal with argument. It appears that
the reporter had more difficulty transcribing argument, where
the discussions were more heated.51
Errors in transcribing arguments made outside the
presence of the jury are of less significance than errors in
other portions of the transcript. This is because these
arguments are relevant to appeals only in reviewing trial
court rulings, reviewing proffers of evidence, and determining
what issues were raised in the trial court. In the instant
case, Menzies does not cite any errors in the trial court's
rulings, and there is no indication that the court's rulings
were incorrectly transcribed. Likewise, there are no
references to the record or other indications, other than the
one instance discussed above, that an error occurred in the
50. There is also some confusion concerning the date of the
second contact between Savage and the prosecutors. Savage's
testimony concerning the second contact was as follows:
"Q. WHAT'S THE DATE. A. 7-3-86 [court reporter's notes read
-7-30-86"]. Q. WAS THIS PRIOR TO THE RULE 35 HEARING? A.
YES, JUST A FEW DAYS." Although there is confusion as to the
exact date of this contact, it is clear that it occurred
shortly before the rule 35 hearing and after the preliminary
hearing. In any event, the exact date of this second contact
has no relevance to any appellate issue.
51. See infra note 55.
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transcription of a proffer of evidence. All of the cited
errors relate only to whether a particular argument concerning
the admission of testimony was not raised at trial and
therefore should be reviewed under a plain error standard.52
The errors that occurred in the arguments are similar
to the errors that occurred throughout the transcript. There
are discrepancies between the original transcript and the
court reporter's notes,53 instances where the attorney's
arguments are inarticulate, 54 an(j[ instances where there is
confusion concerning who is speaking. 55 However, because it
52. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
53. An example occurred in arguments over whether a
prosecuting attorney would have to testify and then be recused
from the case. The prosecuting attorney stated: "IT'S
RIDICULOUS. IT REALLY IS. I CAN'T USE ANY OTHER WORDS, JUST
NOT LEGITIMATE TO SAY, 'HEY, OUGHT TO BE RECUSED [reporter's
notes read "REDUCED"].' M
It is clear from the context that
recused is the correct term. Furthermore, the extensive
argument on this point leaves no doubt as to what the parties'
positions were on this subject.
54. An example is a statement by Menzies' counsel: "SO WE
WOULD FURTHER HAVE FIRST OF ALL INDICATED TO THE COURT THAT HE
WAS NOT UNAVAILABLE." The meaning of this statement is clear.
55. In one instance, the court reporter's notes did not
identify who was speaking and the note reader inserted the
names of the speakers. This type of problem is unusual and
may be related to the contentious nature of the argument.
However, read in context it is possible to tell who is
actually speaking. In any event, understanding this specific
exchange is not necessary to determine what issues were being
raised:
IN YOUR SITUATION, YOURS WAS AN
ARGUMENTATIVE ADVOCACY ROLE OR ACTIVE ROLE
ON BEHALF OF A PARTICULAR CLIENT WHOSE
CREDIBILITY IS IN QUESTION. THEY ARE
TWO—ENTIRELY DIFFERENT THINGS, RICK, AND I
CAN CERTAINLY PROVIDE YOU WITH THE CASES
THAT—IN WHICH COUNSEL HAVE BEEN PLACED IN
THAT POSITION, AND YOU CAN SEE WHAT THOSE
ARE.
[Note reader inserts "MR. JONES:"] BUT
THAT'S THE ENTIRE PURPOSE FOR YOUR RIGHT.
EVERYBODY WOULD BECOME A WITNESS WHO
INTERVIEWS ANYONE UNDER THOSE
CIRCUMSTANCES. [Possible change of speaker
not indicated in transcript.] THESE TWO
SITUATIONS ARE ENTIRELY DIFFERENT. AND
YOUR CREDIBILITY BECOMES AT ISSUE.
MS. WELLS: MR. JONES—[added by note
reader].
(Continued on page 23.)
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is only necessary to determine what issues were being raised,
problems with one or two words or statements are more readily
reconcilable than errors occurring in other portions of the
transcript. This is particularly true in the instant case,
where there were three separate arguments concerning the
admission of the preliminary hearing testimony. In each
hearing, many of the same issues were raised. Given the
rather extensive argument, there is no difficulty in
determining what issues were presented to the trial court.
Menzies, however, points to a specific error in this
portion of the transcript as illustrative of how the
transcript prejudices his case on appeal. In a hearing held
before trial, there was some confusion concerning what rule of
evidence the attorneys were arguing. It appears from the
context of the hearing that the attorneys were discussing
rule 804(a). However, regardless of what rule was being
argued, Menzies is not prejudiced by this confusion. The
purpose of the hearing was to establish if Britton must be
brought into court to determine if he would not testify. The
court ruled in favor of Menzies. Therefore, any error in the
transcription of this hearing does not impact Menzies' appeal.
None of the errors relating to the admission of
Britton's preliminary hearing testimony are prejudicial.
3.

Specific Errors

A section of Menzies' brief is devoted to
establishing that specific transcription errors prejudice his
ability to raise particular claims on appeal. Specific errors
which deal with voir dire or the admission of Britton's
preliminary hearing testimony have been addressed above. The
remaining errors deal with the transcription of numbers, the
penalty phase, and the swearing in of witnesses. However,
when these errors are viewed in the context of the testimony
and in the context of the specific appellate issue, it is
clear that they are not prejudicial. Indeed, this section is
particularly illustrative of how minor transcription errors
and discrepancies will generally have very little impact on
appeal.
(a)

Numbers.

Throughout the transcript, it appears that the court
reporter had particular difficulty in transcribing numbers.
Therefore, there is often confusion concerning addresses,
distances, and dates. Menzies claims that these errors
prejudice his ability to raise claims concerning the admission
(Footnote 55 continued.)
MR. JONES: OH, GOD, THIS IS ABSURD.
MS. WELLS: YOUR LAUGHING IS INTERRUPTING.

23

No. 880161

of identification cards belonging to the victim, the identification of Menzies as a man seen near the location where the
victim's body was found, sufficiency of the evidence to
convict Menzies of robbery and kidnaping, and an unspecified
claim regarding statements Menzies made to police officers.
Each claim will be addressed separately.
(i) Admission of identification cards. During the
trial, the victim's social security card, found among Menzies'
possessions, and three other identification cards belonging to
the victim, found at the Salt Lake County jail, were admitted
into evidence. Menzies objected at trial to the admission of
all the cards. However, in his docketing statement he claims
only that the court erred in the admission of the social
security card on the ground that it contained inadmissible
hearsay. In this appeal, he claims that discrepancies
concerning dates and a stipulation prejudice his ability to
pursue claims concerning the admission of these cards.
At the time of the murder and prior to his arrest,
Menzies was living with Nicole Arnold. After Menzies' arrest
but before trial, Arnold met and married Rodney Duffy. When
Duffy was moving Arnold's possessions into his house, he found
the victim's social security card. He took the card to
Arnold's mother, Janet Franks, who phoned the police. The
police arrived and took possession of the card. This all
occurred on the same day the card was found.
At trial, the State called the victim's husband,
who identified the social security card, Duffy, Franks, and
the police officer who took possession of the card. In
cross-examination of Franks, Menzies emphasized that Franks
was confused as to the year she received the social security
card. The discrepancy which Menzies claims prejudices his
appeal occurred during this questioning.
Menzies' counsel asked, "WAS THE CARD GIVEN TO YOU
SOMETIME IN 1986 [court reporter's notes read "1987"], BEING
SEVERAL MONTHS AGO, OR WAS IT GIVEN TO YOU IN 1987 [court
reporter's notes read "1986"], UP TO A YEAR AND SOME MONTHS
AGO?" This line of questioning continued until Franks stated
that she had no idea what year she received the social
security card.
This discrepancy is not prejudicial. The context
of the sentence itself establishes the correct dates. The
transcript clearly contains the information the question was
designed to elicit—that the witness did not remember what
year she received the social security card. The police
officer who took custody of the card testified that he
received the card in 1986. Furthermore, the error does not
relate to Menzies' claim that the card contains inadmissible
hearsay.
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The discrepancy relating to the admission of the
other identification cards is similarly insignificant. During
Menzies' booking process, he suddenly broke away from the
jailers and ran into a dressing room. He was alone in the
dressing room for several seconds. Later that day, a jail
employee, Jay Smith, found three identification cards
belonging to the victim in a hamper in the dressing room. Not
realizing the significance of the cards, Smith placed them in
a drawer in the room. A few days later, a jailer, Officer
Valdez, recovered the cards.
At trial, the State called the jailers who booked
Menzies into jail, Smith, and Valdez. Menzies' attorney asked
Valdez how he was sure he found the cards after February 24,
the date Menzies was booked into jail. Valdez testified that
he could refer to his work schedule, particularly the type of
duties which he performed, to help him remember the approximate
date on which he recovered the cards. The discrepancy which
Menzies claims prejudices his appeal occurred in the follow-up
questions: MQ. DID YOU WORK ON THE 26TH [court reporter's
notes read "22nd"] OF FEBRUARY? A. NO, MA'AM." Menzies
claims that this discrepancy makes it impossible to determine
if Valdez discovered the cards before or after Menzies was
booked.
However, given Valdez's testimony that he
remembered the approximate date on which he found the cards by
recalling the type of duties he performed that day, the exact
dates on which Valdez did not work are not highly relevant.
The transcript clearly establishes that Valdez testified that
he found the card after the 24th. Smith testified that he
found the card on the 24th. Furthermore, Menzies did not ask
the trial judge not to admit the cards because Valdez found
them before Menzies was booked. Nor was any such argument
made to the jury. Finally, even assuming that a transcription
error prejudices Menzies' ability to raise claims concerning
the admission of the cards found at the jail, this should not
result in a new trial. Given the strong evidence of guilt and
the admission of the victim's other identification cards, any
error in the admission of these cards would be harmless.
Menzies claims that a discrepancy in a stipulation
as to how long the booking process lasted is prejudicial. He
contends that a shorter booking process would establish that
he did not have time to hide the cards in the hamper.
However, no such argument was ever raised at trial. The
testimony of several jailers established that Menzies was
alone in the dressing room for a few seconds. The length of
the booking process does not impact on the length of time
Menzies was alone in the dressing room. In any event, it is
clear from the transcript that the stipulation in question
does not purport to establish what time the booking process
was completed.
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(ii) Identification of Menzies. Tim Larabee was at
Storm Mountain, where the victim's body was found, during the
time the victim was missing and before her body was
discovered. He testified that he twice saw a man and a woman
walking together, heard a scream, and then saw the man leave
alone. At trial, Larabee identified the man as Menzies.
In the transcript, there is a discrepancy concerning
whether Larabee first saw the man and the woman from a
distance of twenty or fifty yards. However, this discrepancy
is easily reconcilable. When asked the same question on
cross-examination, Larabee stated that the distance was fifty
yards. In any event, the distance from which Larabee first
viewed the man is not particularly relevant. Larabee did not
see the man's face until he saw the man for the third time.
There is also a discrepancy concerning the date on
which a composite drawing was prepared from Larabee's
description. This discrepancy, however, is resolved by
comparing the testimony of Larabee and the police officer who
prepared the drawing. No motion was ever made to suppress the
identification, and no claim concerning the identification was
presented in Menzies' docketing statement.
(iii) Insufficient evidence of kidnaping and
robbery. At trial and in his docketing statement, Menzies
maintains that there was insufficient evidence to convict him
of kidnaping and robbery, the convictions used to elevate the
homicide to first degree murder. Menzies claims that a
discrepancy concerning the amount of money taken from the gas
station prejudices this claim. However, the discrepancy did
not occur in the testimony but rather in the State's closing
argument. The prosecutor stated, "THAT FINAL AUDIT DETERMINED
THAT THERE WAS SOMEWHERE BETWEEN $115 [court reporter's notes
read "$114"] AND $116 MISSING. . . . AND IT WAS CERTAINLY A
FIGURE REMARKABLY CLOSE TO THE $115 WHICH MR. DENTER TESTIFIED
TO WHEN HE SAID HE REMOVED THAT AMOUNT CONCEALED IN AN
UMBRELLA AT THE DEFENDANT'S RESIDENCE." Because this
discrepancy does not concern evidence but rather the
prosecutor's closing argument and because there was confusion
in the evidence concerning the exact amount of money at issue,
this discrepancy is not prejudicial.
(iv) Menzies' statement to the police. The State
called Officer Thompson, who testified about an interview he
had with Menzies concerning Menzies' whereabouts the night the
victim disappeared. Thompson testified that Menzies told him
that on the night in question, he picked up a woman who was
hitchhiking. Menzies and the hitchhiker drove around for a
while and talked, and then he took the hitchhiker to his
house. At approximately 2:30 a.m., Arnold, Menzies'
girlfriend, phoned from a trailer park and asked Menzies to
take her home. Menzies and the hitchhiker picked up Arnold

No. 880161

26

and returned to Menzies* house, where Arnold and the
hitchhiker had a fight. Menzies and the hitchhiker left the
house, drove around, and got stuck in the mud. The hitchhiker
left Menzies at this point, and Menzies returned home to
Arnold.
Menzies claims that he is prejudiced by
discrepancies in the date on which the interview took place,
the location where he picked up the hitchhiker, and the
location where the car got stuck in the mud. However, he does
not identify what claim these discrepancies prejudice.
Menzies did not object to the admission of this evidence.5£!
In fact, during cross-examination, Menzies' counsel attempted
to bolster Menzies* story. Given the fact that this evidence
supported Menzies' case, an erroneous ruling admitting this
evidence cannot be prejudicial. Furthermore, this evidence
conflicts with other evidence which supports the jury's
verdict. Therefore, an appellate court would not consider
this evidence in ruling on an insufficient evidence
claim.57 Thus, no transcription error in this portion of
the transcript could possibly prejudice Menzies' appeal.
In any event, the relevant content of this testimony
is preserved in the transcript. The exact date on which the
interview took place is insignificant, and from the context of
the testimony, it is clear that the interview took place
between February 23 and February 29. On cross-examination, it
was established that Menzies picked up the hitchhiker at a
location near Mark's Lounge, a club where the victim had a
membership. The location in which Menzies claims to have been
stuck in the mud is of no consequence. The relevant
information—that Menzies has an explanation for the mud found
on and in the car—is in the transcript.

(b)

penalty phase.

Menzies asserts that transcription errors in the
penalty phase prejudice his ability to claim that the death
penalty was improperly imposed, a claim that Menzies raises in
his docketing statement. However, the errors Menzies cites
are either reconcilable or inconsequential. The transcript is
thus sufficient for this court to review the penalty phase and
determine if the "'sentence resulted from prejudice or
arbitrary action or was disproportionate.'"58
56. Menzies objected and moved for a mistrial on the ground
that Thompson testified that the next day, Menzies went to the
parole office. However, Menzies does not claim that
transcription errors prejudice his ability to pursue this
claim.
57. See, e.g., State v. Warden, 813 P.2d 1146, 1150 (Utah
1991) .
58. State v. Holland, 777 P.2d 1019, 1026 (Utah 1989)
(quoting State v. Pierre. 572 P.2d 1338, 1345 (Utah 1977)).
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A discrepancy occurred in transcribing the testimony
concerning the qualifications of a defense expert witness.
There is confusion as to whether the witness based a pilot
study on one or one hundred patients. It would seem clear
that a pilot study would be based on more than one patient.
However, even assuming the error cannot be reconciled, it is
insignificant. The discrepancy involves only one question,
and the questioning concerning the witness's qualification was
extensive, covering over nine transcript pages. The record
clearly establishes that the witness was qualified to testify
as an expert.
There are also discrepancies in the testimony
concerning Menzies* I.Q. percentile. However, other portions
of the record indicate that Menzies was functioning in the
"average range of intellectual functioning." Testimony concerning a diagnosis contained in a psychological evaluation
Menzies underwent as a juvenile is unintelligible,, However,
the transcript can be reconciled by referring to the evaluation, which was entered into evidence. In any event, the
important information—that Menzies' expert witness's opinion
differs from the opinion expressed in the evaluation—is
present in the record.
While there are other errors in the penalty phase,
the basic information Menzies offered at trial is present in
the record and adequate to review his claims.
(c)

Swearing in of witnesses.

Menzies claims that because the court reporter used
asterisks to represent the swearing in of witnesses, it is
impossible to tell if the witnesses were sworn.59 However,
the use of symbols to represent redundant occurrences such as
the swearing in of a witness is simply a method of shorthand.
Although Menzies cites to the transcript to support his claim,
both the transcript and the court record indicate that the
witnesses were properly sworn. Furthermore, there was no
claim at trial or in the docketing statement relating to the
swearing of witnesses.
It is evident from the record that none of the
errors cited by Menzies as prejudicial substantially affect
his ability to appeal his conviction or sentence.
4.

Plain Error

Menzies also claims that he is prejudiced because the
transcription errors prevent appellate counsel or the supreme
59. Menzies also claims that the names of three witnesses who
the court reporter indicated were sworn when the exclusionary
rule was invoked are not included in the transcript. However,
Menzies' cite does not support this contention.
n n n i c 1
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court from adequately reviewing the record for plain error.
Implicit in this argument is the assertion that because it is
so difficult to determine how transcription errors affect a
review for plain error, Menzies should not be required to
establish which transcription error prejudices such a review.
This assertion is without merit.
The only added difficulty in determining whether a
mistake in the transcript prejudices a claim of plain error,
as opposed to an error that has been properly preserved, is
determining what appellate issue the transcription error
impacts. However, unless the transcript is so inarticulate
that it is impossible to tell what evidence is being offered
or what issue is being argued, it is always possible to
determine what appellate claims a transcription error impacts
by viewing the error in the context of the relevant passage.
This is particularly true in case of plain error, where the
error must be both harmful and obvious.60
It is true that a record could be so severely
affected by transcription errors that it would be impossible
to ascertain what arguments are being made or what evidence Is
being offered. However, a review of the entire record reveals
no instance where it is impossible to determine what
conceivable appellate issues are impacted by specific errors.
Since transcription errors of such a magnitude that might
render significant portions of the record inarticulate would
be obvious in nature, it is clear that the condition of the
record does not prevent review for plain error.
Indeed, there is only one instance where due to a
transcription error, plain error might have occurred. During
the testimony of the medical examiner, a juror fainted. The
transcript reads as follows:
DR. SWEENEY, DID YOU FIND ANYTHING ELSE
DURING YOUR INTERNAL EXAMINATION?
THE COURT:
A MOMENT.

LETS CALL A RECESS HERE.

HAVE THEM TAKE THE JUROR OUT.
FAINTED.

JUST

ONE JUROR

(TAKING THE JUROR OUT.)
MR. JONES: JUDGE WITH REFERENCE TO WHICH
EXHIBIT IS IT? IT'S THE IDENTIFICATION OF
MAUREEN HUNSAKER. THE DEFENSE APPARENTLY
OBJECTED ON THE GROUNDS THEY FELT THERE WAS
MORE FOUNDATION REQUIRED . . . .
60.

See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
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MS. WELLS: EXCUSE ME, JUST A MINUTE, I
DIDN'T MEAN TO INTERRUPT, BUT THE
DEFENDANT IS NOT HERE. . . . HE NEEDS TO
BE PRESENT YOUR HONOR. . . .
MR. JONES: WE CAN MAKE THE ARGUMENT,
AGAIN. . . . I JUST THOUGHT MAYBE WE CAN
RESOLVE THIS, SOME OF THIS STUFF.
THE COURT: WHAT PARTICULARLY HAPPENED
DURING THE JURORS—DURING THE COURSE OF
THE TRIAL. RICK WOULD BE A LITTLE MORE
SUBTLE OR SOPHISTICATED.
WE WILL RECESS UNTIL 2:00 P.M.
(RECESS UNTIL 2:00 P.M.)
After the recess, the juror who fainted was brought
into court and explained that she fainted due to the nature
of the testimony and the fact that she had not eaten. She
also stated that she had eaten lunch, remembered the medical
examiner's testimony, and was able to continue.
It is clear that an omission occurred in this
portion of the transcript. It is also clear that some
discussion was held at this point. Nonetheless, any
prejudice Menzies suffers because of this error can be cured.
All of the medical examiner's testimony is present
in the record. Also, the court's discussion with the juror
who fainted is properly recorded.61 Therefore, the error
only impacts a discussion held outside the presence of the
jury. Although the court's statement is unintelligible, the
statements of the prosecutor indicate that no ruling was made
and the issues discussed were reargued later in the proceedings. Therefore, it would appear that Menzies suffered no
prejudice -from this omission. Indeed, there is no contention that anything of significance occurred at this point in
the proceedings.
In any event, it is possible to cure the fact that
some of the arguments are missing without ordering a new
trial. All that is necessary to insure that Menzies in not
prejudiced by this omission is to review any claim that could
have conceivably been raised at this point as though it had
been properly preserved.62
61. The record is sufficient to review any claim concerning
the effect one juror's fainting had on the other members of
the jury. See supra section III.B.1(b)(i) (relating to the
omission of admonitions).
62. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
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Given the fact that no prejudicial transcription
error has been identified, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in ruling that the transcript was adequate for an
appeal. The record is sufficient to proceed with an appeal on
the merits. If, in the context of discussing specific
appellate issues, Menzies can demonstrate that a transcription
error prejudices his case, it would be proper to grant him a
new trial at that time. However, absent an indication that
errors prejudice his ability to raise or identify appellate
issues, the existence of transcription errors alone does not
justify a new trial.
IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS

Menzies argues that several provisions of the state
and federal constitutions prohibit the use of either
transcript on appeal.
Specifically, he claims that the use of the
transcripts interferes with his ability to appeal his death
sentence and therefore violates his right to be free from
cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth amendment of the
federal constitution and his right to due process of law under
the fourteenth amendment of the federal constitution. It is
true that the eighth and fourteenth amendments require states
which impose capital punishment to develop a sentencing scheme
that genuinely narrows the class of persons upon whom the
death penalty can be imposed and provides a meaningful basis
for distinguishing the cases in which an individual is
sentenced to death.63 It is also true that in states such
as Utah, where the fact finder weighs aggravating and
mitigating factors in the decision to impose the death
penalty, a ''meaningful appellate review" of the penalty phase
has been held to be an essential component of the sentencing
scheme.64 However, since none of the transcription errors
prejudice Menzies* appeal, use of the transcripts does not
deprive him of a "meaningful appellate review." Accordingly,
use of the transcripts on appeal will not violate his rights
under the eighth amendment or the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment.
In a separate argument, Menzies claims that the
transcription errors limit his ability to appeal and therefore
the use of the transcripts will deprive him of his right to
equal protection under the fourteenth amendment of the federal
constitution. Utah law affords persons sentenced to death the
right to an appeal and the right to the use of a transcript on
63. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976); Furman v.
Georgia. 408 U.S. 238, 293-95 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring);
State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 77 (Utah 1981), cert, denied. 459
U.S. 988 (1982).
64. Parker v. Duaaer, 111 S. Ct. 731, 739 (1991).

appeal, 65 The right of appeal is a fundamental right.
Therefore, Menzies has a federal constitutional right under
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the
use of a transcript. 66 However, there is no constitutional
right to a perfect transcript. Rather, criminal defendants
have the right to a "record of sufficient completeness to
permit proper consideration of [their] claims." 67 As noted
above, the transcription errors in the instant case do not
prevent "proper consideration of [Menzies'] claims."
Therefore, use of the transcripts does not violate equal
protection.
Menzies argues that the condition of the transcripts
prevents defense counsel from adequately reviewing the record
and therefore denies Menzies' sixth amendment right to
assistance of counsel. It has already been determined that
the transcription errors do not interfere with appellate
counsel's review of the record. Therefore, this claim also
fails.
In addition to claims under the federal constitution,
Menzies also argues that the use of the transcripts will
violate numerous provisions of the state constitution. However, at no time in the proceeding has Menzies provided any
analysis for this assertion, other than arguing that in
certain circumstances state constitutions may provide greater
protections to criminal defendants than the federal constitution. Therefore, these claims will not be addressed. As we
have previously stated, "[T]he mere mention of a claim of
error . . . is not necessarily enough, even in death cases, to
require that we engage in a full-blown analysis of the claim.
Unless the error is manifest on the record, not only must it
be raised, but an argument must be briefed." 68
Menzies' final claim is based on the assertion that
the prosecutor supplemented the record without his knowledge
or consent. He claims that this violated several provisions
of the federal constitution. However, the State has
stipulated to the removal of the prosecutor's comments.
Therefore, the ex parte supplementation of the record is
harmless and does not constitute grounds for a new trial. 69
65. See Utah Const, art. I, § 12; Utah Code Ann,
§ 76-3-206(2).
66. See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18-19
(1958); Dowd v. United States, 340 U.S. 206, 208-10 (1951).
67. Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 499 (1963).
68. State v. Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n.5 (Utah 1988)
(habeas corpus granted on other grounds in Laffertv v. Cook,
949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991)).
69. £e£ State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203, 1213 (Utah 1989),
cert, denied, 494 U.S. 1018 (1990).
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We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying the motion for a new trial. We
therefore order Menzies to proceed with the appeal on the
merits. As noted above, in the appeal on the merits Menzies
may attempt to demonstrate how certain transcription errors
prejudice his appeal. Furthermore, due to the omission which
occurred during the medical examiner's testimony, we will
review any claim that conceivably could have been raised at
that point as though it was properly preserved. Other than
this one instance, the transcription errors do not impact
Menzies' appeal.
Affirmed.

WE CONCUR:

Richard C. Howe, Associate
Chief Justice

Christine M. Durham, Justice

Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice
Stewart, Justice, dissents.

33

No. 880161

